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ITERATED LD-PROBLEM IN NON-ASSOCIATIVE KEY
ESTABLISHMENT
ARKADIUS KALKA AND MINA TEICHER
Abstract. We construct new non-associative key establishment protocols for
all left self-distributive (LD), multi-LD-, and mutual LD-systems. The hard-
ness of these protocols relies on variations of the (simultaneous) iterated LD-
problem and its generalizations. We discuss instantiations of these protocols
using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups and their quotients, LD-
conjugacy and f -symmetric conjugacy in groups. We suggest parameter choices
for instantiations in braid groups, symmetric groups and several matrix groups.
1. Introduction
In an effort to construct new key establishment protocols (KEPs), which are
hopefully harder to break than previously proposed non-commutative schemes,
the first author introduced in his PhD thesis [Ka07] (see also [Ka12]) the first non-
associative generalization of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP [AAG99], which
revolutionized the field of non-commutative public key cryptography (PKC) more
than ten years ago. For an introduction to non-commutative public key cryptog-
raphy we refer to the book by Myasnikov et al. [MSU11]. For further motivation
and on non-associative PKC we refer to [Ka12]. It turns out (see [Ka12]) that
in the context of AAG-like KEPs for magmas, left self-distributive systems (LD-
systems) and their generalizations (like multi-LD-systems) naturally occur. A
construction that provides KEPs for all LD-, multi-LD- and mutually left dis-
tributive systems was presented in [KT13]. With this method at hand any LD-
or multi-LD-system automatically provides a KEP, and we obtain a rich variety
of new non-associatiave KEPs coming from LD-, multi-LD-, and other left dis-
tributive systems. Here, we propose somehow improved, iterated versions of the
KEPs from [KT13].
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Outline. In section 2 we review LD-, multi-LD-, and mutually left distributive
systems and provide several important examples, namely LD-conjugacy and f -
symmetric conjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Section
3 describes a KEP for all LD-systems, namely an iterated version of Protocol 1
from [KT13], and we discuss related base problems. In section 4 we describe and
analyze a KEP which does not only apply for all multi-LD-systems, but also for a
big class of partial multi-LD-systems. This KEP is an iterated version of Protocol
2 from [KT13]. In section 5 we discuss instantiations of these general protocols
using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. In particular, in section
5.3 we discuss a relevant base problem, namely the (subgroup) conjugacy coset
problem, which seems to be a relatively new group-theortic problem, apparently
first mentioned in [KT13]. In section 5.4 we propose several concrete instantia-
tions with parameter suggestions in braid and symmetric groups. Section 6 deals
with other instantiations, namely instantiations using f -conjugacy (section 6.1)
and instantiations using f -symmetric conjugacy (section 6.2) in groups. For both
LD-systems we provide concrete instantiations in finite and infinite matrix groups
with suggestions for parameter choices.
Implementation. All concrete realizations of the KEPs were implemented in
MAGMA [BCP97] which also contains an implementation of braid groups follow-
ing [CK+01]. Implementation details for these non-associative KEPs are provided
in [KT13a].
2. LD-systems and other distributive systems
2.1. Definitions.
Definition 2.1. A left self-distributive (LD) system (S, ∗) is a set S equipped
with a binary operation ∗ on S which satisfies the left self-distributivity law
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ (x ∗ z) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
Definition 2.2. (Section X.3. in [De00]) Let I be an index set. A multi-LD-
system (S, (∗i)i∈I) is a set S equipped with a family of binary operations (∗i)i∈I
on S such that
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = (x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) for all x, y, z ∈ S
is satisfied for every i, j in I. Especially, it holds for i = j, i.e., (S, ∗i) is an
LD-system. If |I| = 2 then we call S a bi-LD-system.
More vaguely, we will also use the terms partial multi-LD-system and simply
left distributive system if the laws of a multi-LD-system are only fulfilled for
special subsets of S or if only some of these (left) distributive laws are satisfied.
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Definition 2.3. A mutual left distributive system (S, ∗a, ∗b) is a set S equipped
with two binary operations ∗a, ∗b on S such that
x∗a (y∗bz) = (x∗ay)∗b(x∗az) x∗b (y∗az) = (x∗by)∗a(x∗bz) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
A mutual left distributive system (L, ∗a, ∗b) is only a partial bi-LD-system. The
left selfdistributivity laws need not hold, i.e., (L, ∗a) and (L, ∗b) are in general no
LD-systems.
2.2. Examples. We list examples of LD-systems, multi-LD-systems and mutual
left distributive systems. More details can be found in [De00, De06, Ka12, KT13].
2.2.1. Trivial example. (S, ∗) with x ∗ y = f(y) is an LD-system for any function
f : S → S.
2.2.2. Free LD-systems. A set S with a binary operation ∗, that satisfies no other
relations than those resulting from the left self-distributivity law, is a free LD-
system. Free LD-systems are studied extensively in [De00].
2.2.3. Conjugacy. A classical example of an LD-system is (G, ∗) where G is a
group equipped with the conjugacy operation x∗y = x−1yx (or x∗rev y = xyx−1).
Note that such an LD-system cannot be free, because conjugacy satisfies addi-
tionally the idempotency law x ∗ x = x.
2.2.4. Laver tables. Finite groups equipped with the conjugacy operation are not
the only finite LD-systems. Indeed, the socalled Laver tables provide the classical
example for finite LD-systems. There exists for each n ∈ N an unique LD-system
Ln = ({1, 2, . . . , 2
n}, ∗) with k ∗ 1 = k + 1. The values for k ∗ l with l 6= 1 can be
computed by induction using the left self-distributive law. The Laver tables for
n = 1, 2, 3 are
L1 1 2
1 2 2
2 1 2
L2 1 2 3 4
1 2 4 2 4
2 3 4 3 4
3 4 4 4 4
4 1 2 3 4
L3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8
2 3 4 7 8 3 4 7 8
3 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8
4 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8
5 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8
6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8
7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Laver tables are also described in [De00].
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2.2.5. LD-conjugacy. Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G). Set
x ∗f y = f(x
−1y)x,
then (G, ∗f) is an LD-system. We call an ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G × G f -LD-
conjugated or LD-conjugated, or simply f -conjugated, denoted by u −→∗f v, if
there exists a c ∈ G such that v = c ∗f u = f(c
−1u)c.
More general, let f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation x ∗ y = f(x−1) ·
g(y) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
(1) fh = f, gh = hg = hf, fg = gf = f 2, h2 = h.
See Proposition 2.3 in [KT13]. The simplest solution of the system of equations
(1) is f = g and h = id which leads to the definition of LD-conjugacy given
above.
2.2.6. Shifted conjugacy. Consider the braid group on infinitely many strands
B∞ = 〈{σi}i≥1 | σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2, σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1〉
where inside σi the (i+ 1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. The shift map
∂ : B∞ −→ B∞ defined by σi 7→ σi+1 for all i ≥ 1 is an injective endomorphism.
Then B∞ equipped with the shifted conjugacy operations ∗, ∗¯ defined by
x ∗ y = ∂x−1 · σ1 · ∂y · x, x ∗¯ y = ∂x
−1 · σ−11 · ∂y · x
is a bi-LD-system. In particular, (B∞, ∗) is an LD-system.
Dehornoy points out, that once the definition of shifted conjugacy is used,
braids inevitably appear (see Exercise I.3.20 in [De00]). Consider a group G,
an endomorphism f ∈ End(G), and a fixed element a ∈ G. Then the binary
operation x∗y = x∗f,ay = f(x)
−1·a·f(y)·x yields an LD-structure onG if and only
if [f 2(x), a] = 1 for all x ∈ G, and a satisfies the relation af(a)a = f(a)af(a)1.
Hence the subgroup H = 〈{fn(a) | n ∈ N}〉 of G is a homomorphic image of
the braid group B∞ on infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is
a quotient of B∞. In case of a = 1 this subgroup H is trivial and the binary
operation ∗f,1 becomes f -conjugacy.
There exists a straightforward generalization of Exercise I.3.20 in [De00] for
multi-LD-systems:
Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of endomorphisms (fi)i∈I
of G, and a set of fixed elements {ai ∈ G | i ∈ I}. Then (G, (∗i)i∈I) with
x ∗i y = fi(x
−1) · ai · fi(y) · x
is a multi-LD-system if and only if fi = fj =: f for all i 6= j,
(2) [ai, f
2(x)] = 1 ∀x ∈ G, i ∈ I, and aif(ai)aj = f(aj)aif(ai) ∀i, j ∈ I.
1 Note that [∂2(x), σ1] = 1 for all x ∈ B∞, and σ1∂(σ1)σ1 = ∂(σ1)σ1∂(σ1) holds.
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For a proof see, e.g. Proposition 4.6 in [Ka12].
2.2.7. Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. In the following we consider
generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations ∗ in B∞. We set f = ∂
p for
some p ∈ N, and we choose ai ∈ B2p for all i ∈ I such that
(3) ai∂
p(ai)aj = ∂
p(aj)ai∂
p(ai) for all i, j ∈ I.
Since ai ∈ B2p, we have [ai, ∂
2p(x)] = 1 for all x ∈ B∞. Thus the conditions (2)
are fulfilled, and x ∗i y = x∂
p(y)ai∂
p(x−1) defines a multi-LD-structure on B∞.
For |I| = 1, p = 1 and a = σ1, which implies H = B∞, we get Dehornoy’s original
definition of shifted conjugacy ∗.
It remains to give some natural solutions {ai ∈ B2p | i ∈ I} of the equation set
(3). Let, for n ≥ 2, δn = σn−1 · · ·σ2σ1. For p, q ≥ 1, we set
τp,q = δp+1∂(δp+1) · · ·∂
q−1(δp+1).
Since a = τ±1p,p ∈ B2p fulfills a∂
p(a)a = ∂p(a)a∂p(a), it provides a lot of (multi)-
LD-structures on B∞.
Proposition 2.4. (a) The binary operation x ∗a y = ∂
p(x−1)a∂p(y)x with a =
a′τp,pa
′′ for some a′, a′′ ∈ Bp yields an LD-structure on B∞ if and only if [a
′, a′′] =
1.
(b) Let I be an index set. The binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x with
ai = a
′
iτp,pa
′′
i for some a
′
i, a
′′
i ∈ Bp (i ∈ I) yields a multi-LD-structure on B∞ if
and only if [a′i, a
′
j ] = [a
′
i, a
′′
j ] = 1 for all i, j ∈ I. (Note that a
′′
i and a
′′
j needn’t
commute for i 6= j.)
(c) The binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x (i = 1, 2) with a1 = a
′
1τp,pa
′′
1,
a2 = a
′
2τ
−1
p,pa
′′
2 for some a
′
1, a
′′
1, a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp yields a bi-LD-structure on B∞ if and
only if [a′1, a
′′
1] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2] = [a
′
1, a
′′
2] = [a
′
2, a
′′
1] = [a
′
1, a
′
2] = 1. (Note that a
′′
1 and a
′′
2
needn’t commute.)
(d) (B∞, ∗1, ∗2) with binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x (i = 1, 2) with
a1 = a
′
1τp,pa
′′
1, a2 = a
′
2τ
−1
p,pa
′′
2 for some a
′
1, a
′′
1, a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp is a mutual left distribu-
tive system if and only if [a′1, a
′′
2] = [a
′
2, a
′′
1] = [a
′
1, a
′
2] = 1. (Note that [a
′
1, a
′′
1],
[a′2, a
′′
2] and [a
′′
1, a
′′
2] may be nontrivial.)
The proofs are straightforward computations. The reader is recommended to
draw some pictures.
2.2.8. Symmetric conjugacy. For a groupG, there exists yet another LD-operation.
(G, ◦) is an LD-system with
x ◦ y = xy−1x.
Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation ∗, for this "symmetric conjugacy"
operation ◦, the corresponding relation −→◦, defined by x −→◦ y if and only
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if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c ◦ x, is not an equivalence relation. In
particular, −→◦ is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive.
2.2.9. f -symmetric conjugacy. One may consider several generalizations of this
symmetric conjugacy operation ◦, as candidates for natural LD-operations in
groups. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation
x ◦f,g,h y = f(x) · g(y
−1) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
(4) f 2 = f, fh = gh = fg, hg = gf = hf, h2 = h.
For a proof see Proposition 2.13 in [KT13].
Except for f 2 = f = g = h = h2, the simplest solutions of the system of
equations (4) are f 2 = f = g and h = id, or f = id and g = h = h2.
Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G) an endomorphism that is also a projector
(f 2 = f). Then (G, ◦f) and (G, ◦
rev
f ), defined by
x ◦f y = f(xy
−1)x and x ◦revf y = xf(y
−1x),
are LD-systems.
We have the following left distributivity results.
(i) The binary operations ◦f,g,h and ∗f,g,h are distributive over ◦. In particular ∗
is distributive over ◦. In short, the following equations hold.
x∗f,g,h(y◦z) = (x∗f,g,hy)◦(x∗f,g,hz), x◦f,g,h(y◦z) = (x◦f,g,hy)◦(◦f,g,hz)∀x, y, z ∈ G.
(ii) The operations ◦f and ∗f (∗
rev
f ) are distributive over ◦g if and only if f =
gf = fg.
From (ii) we conclude that (G, ◦f , ◦g) is not a mutual left distributive system
for f 6= g.
3. Key establishment for all LD-systems
3.1. The protocol. Recall that a magma is a set M equipped with a binary
operation, say •, which is possibly non-associative. For our purposes all interest-
ing LD-systems are non-associative. Consider an element y of a magma (M, •)
which is an iterated product of other elements in M . Such an element can be
described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these
other elements y1, . . . , yk ∈M . We use the notation y = T•(y1, . . . , yk). Here the
subscript • tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation
•.
Consider, for example, the element y = ((b • c) • (a • b)) • b. The corresponding
labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the following figure.
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Figure 1. The element y = ((b • c) • (a • b)) • b = T•(b, c, a, b, b)
b c a b b
• •
•
•
It is easy to prove by induction (over the depth of the involved trees) that any
magma homomorphism β : (M, •) → (N, ◦) satisfies
β(T•(y1, . . . , yk)) = T◦(β(y1), . . . , β(yk))
for all y1, . . . , yk ∈M .
Proposition 3.1. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. Then, for any element x ∈ L, the
left multiplication map φx : y 7→ x ∗ y defines a magma endomorphism of L.
Proof. φx(y1 ∗ y2) = x ∗ (y1 ∗ y2)
LD
= (x ∗ y1) ∗ (x ∗ y2) = φx(y1) ∗ φx(y2). 
Proposition 3.2. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system and k ∈ N. Then, for all x1, . . . , xk ∈
L, the iterated left multiplication map
φx1,...,xk : y 7→ xk ∗ (xk−1 ∗ · · · ∗ (x2 ∗ (x1 ∗ y)) · · · )
defines a magma endomorphism of L.
Proof. Proof by induction over k.
φx1,...,xk(y1 ∗ y2) = xk ∗ φx1,...,xk−1(y1 ∗ y2)
IH
= xk ∗ (φx1,...,xk−1(y1) ∗ φx1,...,xk−1(y2))
LD
= (xk ∗ φx1,...,xk−1(y1)) ∗ (xk ∗ φx1,...,xk−1(y2)) = φx1,...,xk(y1) ∗ φx1,...,xk(y2).

We are going to describe a KEP that applies to any LD-system (L, ∗). There are
two public submagmas SA = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗, SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗ of (L, ∗), assigned
to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol 1: Key establishment for any LD-system (L, ∗).
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1: Alice generates her secret key (a0, a1, . . . , akA) ∈ SA × L
kA, and Bob
chooses his secret key b ∈ SkBB . In particular, Alice’s and Bob’s secret
magma morphisms α and β are given by
α(y) = akA ∗ (akA−1 ∗ · · · ∗ (a2 ∗ (a1 ∗ y)) · · · ) and
β(y) = bkB ∗ (bkB−1 ∗ · · · ∗ (b2 ∗ (b1 ∗ y)) · · · ),
respectively.
2: Alice computes the elements (α(ti))1≤i≤n ∈ L
n, p0 = α(a0) ∈ L, and sends
them to Bob. Bob computes the vector (β(sj))1≤j≤m ∈ L
m, and sends it
to Alice.
3: Alice, knowing a0 = T∗(r1, . . . , rl) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
the received message
T∗(β(r1), . . . , β(rl)) = β(T∗(r1, . . . , rl)) = β(a0).
And Bob, knowing for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB, bj = T
(j)
∗ (uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) with
uj,i ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}∀i ≤ lj for some lj ∈ N, computes from his received
message for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB
T (j)∗ (α(uj,1), . . . , α(uj,lj)) = α(T
(j)
∗ (uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) = α(bj).
4: Alice computes KA = α(β(a0)). Bob gets the shared key by
KB := α(bkB) ∗ (α(bkB−1) ∗ (· · · (α(b2) ∗ (α(b1) ∗ p0)) · · · ))
(LD)
= KA.
This protocol is an iterated version of Protocol 1 in [KT13] and an asymmetric
modification of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocols for magmas introduced in
[Ka07, Ka12].
Figure 2. Protocol 1: Key establishment for any LD-
system - iterated version.
Alice Bob
{α(ti) = akA ∗ (· · · ∗ (a1 ∗ ti) · · · )}1≤i≤n, α(a0)
{β(ti) = bkB ∗ (· · · ∗ (b1 ∗ sj) · · · )}1≤j≤ma0 ∈ SA, α b1,..,bkB ∈ SB
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3.2. Base problems. In order to break Protocol 1 an attacker has to find the
shared key K = KA = KB. A successful attack on Bob’s secret key b requires
the solution of
m-simItLDP (m-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem):
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ L
2 with s′i = φb1,...,bkB (si) ∀1 ≤ i ≤
m for some (unknown) b1, . . . , bkB ∈ L and some kB ∈ N.
Objective: Find k′B ∈ N, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
kB
∈ L such that
s′i = b
′
k′
B
∗ (b′k′
B
−1 ∗ (· · · ∗ (b
′
2 ∗ (b
′
1 ∗ si)) · · · )) ∀ i = 1, . . . , m.
Note that in our context, b comes from a restricted domain, namely SkBB ⊆ L
kB .
This might affect distributions when one considers possible attacks. Nevertheless,
we use the notion of (simultaneous) iterated LD-Problem for inputs generated by
potentially arbitrary b ∈ LkB . Similar remarks affect base problems further in
the text.
Even if an attacker finds Bob’s original key b ∈ SkBB or a pseudo-key b
′ ∈ S
k′B
B ⊆⋃∞
i=1 S
i
B (solution to the m-simItLDP above), then she still faces the following
problem for all i = 1, . . . , k′B.
∗-MSP (∗-submagma Membership Search Problem):
Input: t1, . . . , tn ∈ (L, ∗), b
′
i ∈ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗.
Objective: Find an expression of b′i as a tree-word in the submagma 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗
(notation b′i = T∗(u1, . . . , ul) for u1, . . . , ul ∈ {tj}j≤n).
Proposition 3.3. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. We define the generalized m-
simItLDP for SB ⊆ L as an m-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the ob-
jective to find k′B ∈ N and b
′ ∈ S
k′B
B with SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗ such that φb′ :=
φb′
1
,...,b′
k′
B
(si) = s
′
i for all i ≤ m.
An oracle that solves the generalized m-simItLDP and ∗-MSP for SB is suffi-
cient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob’s private key. The gen-
eralized m-simItLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key vector b′ ∈ S
k′
B
B with φb′(si) =
s′i = φb(si) for all i = 1, . . . , m. Observe that this implies for any element eA ∈ SA
that φb′(eA) = φb(eA). In particular, we have φb′(a0) = φb(a0). For i = 1, . . . , k
′
B,
we feed each pseudo-key component b′i into a ∗-MSP oracle for SB which returns
a treeword T
(i)′
∗ (ui,1, . . . , ui,li) = b
′ (for some l ∈ N and ui,j ∈ {tk}k≤n). Now
compute, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k′B,
T (i)
′
∗ (α(ui,1), . . . , α(ui,li))
LD
= α(T (i)
′
∗ (ui,1, . . . , ui,li)) = α(b
′
i).
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This enables us to compute
K ′B = α(b
′
k′
B
) ∗ (α(b′k′
B
−1) ∗ (· · · ∗ (α(b
′
2) ∗ (α(b
′
1) ∗ p0)) · · · ))
α hom
= α(b′k′
B
∗ (b′k′
B
−1 ∗ (· · · ∗ (b
′
2 ∗ (b
′
1 ∗ a0)) · · · )) = α(φb′(a0)) = α(β(a0)) = KA.

Note that here the situation is asymmetric - an attack on Alice’s secret key
requires the solution of the following problem.
n-modsimItLDP (Modified n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem):
Input: An element p0 ∈ L and pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ L
2 with t′i = φa(ti)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n for some (unknown) kA ∈ N and a ∈ L
kA .
Objective: Find k′A ∈ N and elements a
′
0, a
′ ∈ Lk
′
A such that p0 = φa′(a
′
0) and
φa′(ti) = t
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Also here, even if an attacker finds Alice’s original key (a0, a) or a pseudo-key
(a′0, a
′) ∈ SA×L, then she still faces a ∗-submagma Membership Search Problem.
Proposition 3.4. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. We define the generalized n-
modsimItLDP for SA ⊆ L as a modified n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem
with the objective to find k′A ∈ N, a
′ ∈ Lk
′
A and a′0 in SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗ such that
φa′(a
′
0) = p0 and φa′(ti) = t
′
i for all i ≤ n.
An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP and ∗-MSP for SA is suf-
ficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice’s private key. The
generalized n-modsimItLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a′0, a
′)′ ∈ SA × L
k′
A
(for some k′A ∈ N) such that φa′(a
′
0) = p0 and φa′(ti) = a
′
i = a ∗ ti for all
i = 1, . . . , n. Observe that this implies for any element eB ∈ SB that φa′(eB) =
φa(eB) =: α(eB). In particular, we have φa′(bj) = α(bj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB. We
feed the first component a′0 ∈ SA of this pseudo-key into a ∗-MSP oracle for SA
which returns a treeword T ′∗(r1, . . . , rl) = a
′
0 (for some l ∈ N and ri ∈ {sj}j≤m).
Now, we compute
K ′A = φa′(T
′
∗(β(r1), . . . , β(rl)))
LD
= φa′(β(T
′
∗(r1, . . . , rl))) = φa′(β(a
′
0))
= φa′(bkB ∗ (· · · ∗ (b2 ∗ (b1 ∗ a
′
0)) · · · ))
= φa′(bkB) ∗ (· · · ∗ (φa′(b2) ∗ (φa′(b1) ∗ φa′(a
′
0))) · · · )
= φa(bkB) ∗ (· · · ∗ (φa(b2) ∗ (φa(b1) ∗ p0)) · · · ) = KB.

Both appproaches described above require the solution of a ∗-submagma Mem-
bership Search Problem. Note that we assumed that the generalized m-simItLDP
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(resp. n-modsimItLDP) oracle already provides a pseudo-key in the submagma
SB (resp. SA) which we feed to the ∗-MSP oracle. But to check whether an ele-
ment lies in some submagma, i.e. the ∗-submagma Membership Decision Prob-
lem, is already undecidable in general.
Fortunately, for the attacker, there are approaches which do not resort to solv-
ing the ∗-MSP.
Recall that we defined the generalized m-simItLDP for SB ⊆ L as an m-
simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find k′B ∈ N and b
′ in
S
k′
B
B such that φb′(si) = s
′
i for all i ≤ m.
Proposition 3.5. A generalized simItLDP oracle is sufficient to break key es-
tablishment Protocol 1. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized m-
simItLDP for SB and the n-simItLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys - though we need
only a pseudo-key for the second component a′ of Alice’s key. The n-simItLDP
oracle provides a′ ∈ Lk
′
A s.t. φa′(tj) = t
′
j = α(tj) for all j ≤ n. And the generalized
m-simItLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key b′ ∈ S
k′
B
B s.t. φb′(si) = s
′
i = β(si) for
all i ≤ m. Since b′ ∈ S
k′B
B , we conclude that φa′(b
′
i) = α(b
′
i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k
′
B.
Also, a0 ∈ SA implies, of course, φb′(a0) = β(a0). Now, we may compute
K ′B = φa′(b
′
k′
B
) ∗ (· · · ∗ (φa′(b
′
2) ∗ (φa′(b
′
1) ∗ p0)) · · · )
= α(b′k′
B
) ∗ (· · · ∗ (α(b′2) ∗ (α(b
′
1) ∗ α(a0))) · · · )
α hom
= α(b′k′
B
∗ (· · · ∗ (b′2 ∗ (b
′
1 ∗ a0)) · · · ) = α(φb′(a0)) = α(β(a0)) = KA.

Recall that we defined the generalized n-modsimItLDP for SA ⊆ L as an
n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find a a′0 in SA =
〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗ (and a
′ ∈ Lk
′
A) such that φa′(a
′
0) = p0 etc.
Proposition 3.6. An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimItLDP for SA
and the m-simItLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys. The m-
simItLDP oracle provides k′B ∈ N and b
′ ∈ Lk
′
B s.t. φb′(sj) = s
′
j = β(sj) for
all j ≤ m. And the generalized n-modsimItLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key
(a′0, a
′) ∈ SA × L
k′A s.t. φa′(ti) = t
′
i = α(ti) for all i ≤ n and φa′(a
′
0) = p0. Since
a′0 ∈ SA, we conclude that φb′(a
′
0) = β(a
′
0). Also, b ∈ S
k′
B
B implies, of course,
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φa′(bj) = α(bj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k
′
A. Now, we compute
K ′A = φa′(φb′(a
′
0)) = φa′(b
′
k′
B
∗ (· · · ∗ (b′2 ∗ (b
′
1 ∗ a
′
0)) · · · ))
= φa′(bkB) ∗ (· · · ∗ (φa′(b2) ∗ (φa′(b1) ∗ φa′(a
′
0))) · · · )
= α(bkB) ∗ (· · · ∗ (α(b2) ∗ (α(b1) ∗ p0)) · · · ) = KB.

Remark 3.7. Note that in the non-associative setting the case m = n = 1 is of
particular interest, i.e. we may abandon simultaneity in our base problems since
the submagmas generated by one element are still complicated objects.
4. Key establishment for mutual left distributive systems
4.1. The protocol. Here we describe a generalization of Protocol 1 that works
for all mutual left distributive systems, in particular all multi-LD-systems. Con-
sider a set L equipped with a pool of binary operations OA ∪ OB (OA and OB
non-empty) s.t. the operations in OA are distributive over those in OB and vice
versa, i.e. the following holds for all x, y, z ∈ L, ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB.
x ∗α (y ∗β z) = (x ∗α y) ∗β (x ∗α z), and(5)
x ∗β (y ∗α z) = (x ∗β y) ∗α (x ∗β z).(6)
Then (L, ∗α, ∗β) is a mutual left distributive system for all (∗α, ∗β) ∈ OA × OB.
Note that, if OA ∩ OB 6= ∅, then (L,OA ∩ OB) is a multi-LD-system.
Let s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tn ∈ L be some public elements. We denote SA =
〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB , two submagmas of (L,OA∪OB). For ex-
ample, an element y of SA can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose
k leaves are labelled by these other elements r1, . . . , rk with ri ∈ {si}i≤m. Here
the tree contains further information, namely to each internal vertex we assign
a binary operation ∗i ∈ OA. We use the notation y = TOA(r1, . . . , rk). The sub-
script OA tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation
∗i ∈ OA. Consider, for example, the element y = ((s3 ∗α2 s3) ∗α4 s1) ∗α1 (s2 ∗α2 s1).
The corresponding labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the fol-
lowing figure.
Let ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB. By induction over the tree depth, it is easy to show
that, for all elements e, e1, . . . , el ∈ (L,OA ∪ OB) and all planar rooted binary
trees T with l leaves, the following equations hold.
e ∗α TOB(e1, . . . , el) = TOB(e ∗α e1, . . . , e ∗α el),(7)
e ∗β TOA(e1, . . . , el) = TOA(e ∗β e1, . . . , e ∗β el).(8)
Analogeously to Proposition 3.2 one may show the following.
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Figure 3. The element y = ((s3 ∗α2 s3) ∗α4 s1) ∗α1 (s2 ∗α2 s1) ∈ SA
s3 s3 s1 s2 s1
∗α2
∗α4
∗α2
∗α1
Proposition 4.1. Consider (L,OA ∪ OB) such that (L, ∗A, ∗B) is a mutual left
distributive system for all (∗A, ∗B) ∈ OA × OB, and let k ∈ N. Then, for all
x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ L
k, oA = (∗A1, . . . , ∗Ak) ∈ O
k
A, and oB = (∗B1 , . . . , ∗Bk) ∈ O
k
B,
the iterated left multiplication maps
φ(x,oA) : y 7→ xk ∗Ak (xk−1 ∗Ak−1 · · · ∗A3 (x2 ∗A2 (x1 ∗A1 y)) · · · ) and
φ(x,oB) : y 7→ xk ∗Bk (xk−1 ∗Bk−1 · · · ∗B3 (x2 ∗B2 (x1 ∗B1 y)) · · · )
define a magma endomorphisms of (L,OB) and (L,OA), respectively.
In particular, the following equations hold for all k, l ∈ mathbbN , a, b ∈ Lk,
oA ∈ O
k
A, oB ∈ O
k
B, e, e1, . . . , el ∈ L and all planar rooted binary trees T with l
leaves.
φ(a,oA)(TOB(e1, . . . , el)) = TOB(φ(a,oA)(e1), . . . , φ(a,oA)(el)),(9)
φ(b,oB)(TOA(e1, . . . , el)) = TOA(φ(b,oB)(e1), . . . , φ(b,oB)(el))(10)
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system (L,OA ∪OB)
as described above. We have two subsets of public elements {s1, · · · , sm} and
{t1, · · · , tn} of L. Also, recall that SA = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB .
Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol 2: Key establishment for the partial multi-LD-system
(L,OA ∪OB).
1: Alice generates her secret key (a0, a, oA) ∈ SA × L
kA × OkAA , and Bob
chooses his secret key (b, oB) ∈ S
kB
B × O
kB
B . Denote oA = (∗A1 , . . . , ∗AkA )
and oB = (∗B1 , . . . , ∗BkB ), then Alice’s and Bob’s secret magma morphisms
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α and β are given by
α(y) = akA ∗AkA (akA−1 ∗AkA−1 · · · ∗A3 (a2 ∗A2 (a1 ∗A1 y)) · · · ) and
β(y) = bkB ∗BkB (bkB−1 ∗BkB−1 · · · ∗B3 (b2 ∗B2 (b1 ∗B1 y)) · · · ),
respectively.
2: (α(ti))1≤i≤n ∈ L
n, p0 = α(a0) ∈ L, and sends them to Bob. Bob computes
the vector (β(sj))1≤j≤m ∈ L
m, and sends it to Alice.
3: Alice, knowing a0 = TOA(r1, . . . , rl) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes
from the received message
TOA(β(r1), . . . , β(rl)) = β(TOA(r1, . . . , rl)) = β(a0).
And Bob, knowing for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB, bj = T
(j)
OB
(uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) with
uj,i ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}∀i ≤ lj for some lj ∈ N, computes from his received
message for all 1 ≤ j ≤ kB
T
(j)
OB
(α(uj,1), . . . , α(uj,lj)) = α(T
(j)
OB
(uj,1, . . . , uj,lj) = α(bj).
4: Alice computes KA = α(β(a0)). Bob gets the shared key by
KB := α(bkB) ∗ (α(bkB−1) ∗ (· · · (α(b2) ∗ (α(b1) ∗ p0)) · · · ))
αhomo
= KA.
Figure 4. KEP for the partial multi-LD-system (L,OA ∪OB).
Alice Bob
{φ(a,oA)(ti)}1≤i≤n, φ(a,oA)(a0)
{φ(b,oB)(sj)}1≤j≤ma0 ∈ SA, a ∈ L
kA , oA ∈ O
kA
A
b ∈ SkBB , oB ∈ O
kB
B
Here the operation vectors oA ∈ O
kA
A and oB ∈ O
kB
B are part of Alice’s and
Bob’s private keys. As in Protocol 1, explicit expressions of a0 ∈ SA and all
bi ∈ SB as treewords T, T
(i) (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ kB) are also parts of the private keys
- though we did not mention it explicitly in step 1 of the protocols. But here TOA
and T ′OB also contain all the information about the grafting operations (in OA or
OB, respectively) at the internal vertices of T , T
(1), . . . , T (kB).
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4.2. Base problems. In order to break Protocol 2 an attacker has to find the
shared key K = KA = KB. A successful attack on Bob’s secret key (b, oB) ∈
SkBB × O
kB
B requires (first) the solution of the following problem.
HomSP (Homomorphism Search Problem for SA):
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ L
2 with s′i = φ(b,oB)(si) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m
for some (unknown) kB ∈ N, b ∈ L
kB , oB ∈ O
kB
B .
Objective: Find k′B ∈ N, b
′ ∈ Lk
′
B and o′B ∈ O
k′
B
B , defining a magma homo-
morphism φ(b′,o′
B
) : SA −→ (L,OA), such that φ(b′,o′
B
)(si) = s
′
i for all
i = 1, . . . , m.
Recall that we work in the left distributive system (L,OA ∪ OB). Denote
Hom(SA) = Hom(SA, (L,OA))
= {φ : L −→ L | φ(y1 ∗A y2) = φ(y1) ∗A φ(y2) ∀y1, y2 ∈ SA ∀∗A ∈ OA}.
We define the generalized HomSP for (SA, SB) as a Homomorphism Search Prob-
lem for SA with the objective to find a magma homomorphism φ(b′,o′
B
) ∈ Hom(SA)
with o′B ∈ O
k′B
B (for some k
′
B ∈ N) and b
′ ∈ S
k′B
B (with SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉OB).
Even if an attacker finds a pseudo-key homomorphism φ(b′,o′
B
∈ Hom(SA), then
she still faces the following problem.
OB-MSP (OB-submagma Membership Search Problem for SB):
Input: t1, . . . , tn ∈ L, b ∈ SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉OB .
Objective: Find an expression of b as a tree-word (with internal vertices labelled
by operations in OB) in the submagma SB (notation
b = TOB(u1, . . . , uk) for ui ∈ {tj}j≤n).
Proposition 4.2. An oracle that solves the generalized HomSP for (SA, SB) and
OB-MSP for SB is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 2.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob’s private key. The gener-
alized HomSP-oracle for (SA, SB) provides a k
′
B ∈ N and a pseudo-key homomor-
phism φ(b′,o′
B
) ∈ Hom(SA) with b
′ ∈ S
k′B
B , o
′
B ∈ O
k′B
B such that φ(b′,o′B)(si) = s
′
i =
β(si) for all i = 1, . . . , m. Observe that this implies for any element eA ∈ SA that
φ(b′,o′
B
)(eA) = β(eA). In particular, we have φ(b′,o′
B
)(a0) = β(a0). Since b
′ ∈ S
k′
B
B ,
we may feed, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k′B, b
′
i into a OB-MSP oracle for SB which returns
a tree-word T
(i)′
OB
(ui,1, . . . , ui,li) = b
′
i (for some li ∈ N and ui,j ∈ {tk}k≤n). Now,
we compute for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k′B,
T
(i)′
OB
(α(u1), . . . , α(ul))
αhomo
= α(T
(i)′
OB
(u1, . . . , ul)) = α(b
′
i).
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Let o′B = (∗B1 , . . . , ∗Bk′
B
). This enables us to compute
K ′B = α(b
′
k′
B
) ∗Bk′
B
(α(b′k′
B
−1) ∗Bk′
B
−1
(· · · ∗B3 (α(b
′
2) ∗B2 (α(b
′
1) ∗B1 p0)) · · · ))
α hom
= α(b′k′
B
∗Bk′
B
(b′k′
B
−1 ∗Bk′
B
−1
(· · · ∗B3 (b
′
2 ∗B2 (b
′
1 ∗B1 a0)) · · · ))
= α(φ(b′,o′
B
)(a0)) = α(β(a0)) = KA.

On the other hand, an attack on Alice’s secret key requires (first) the solution
of the following problem.
modHomSP (Modified Homomorphism Search Problem for SB):
Input: Element pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ L
2 with t′i = φa,α(ti) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n for
some (unknown) magma homomorphism φ(a,oA) ∈ End(SB) (with oA ∈
OkAA ). Furthermore, an element p0 ∈ φ(a,oA)(SA), i.e. p0 = φ(a,oA)(a0) for
some a0 ∈ SA.
Objective: Find k′A ∈ N, (a
′
0, φ(a′,o′A)) ∈ L × End(SB) (o
′
A ∈ O
k′A
A ) such that
φ(a′,o′
A
)(ti) = t
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , n and φ(a′,o′A)(a
′
0) = p0.
We define the generalized modHomSP for (SB, SA) as a modified Homomor-
phism Search Problem for SB with the objective to find (a
′
0, φ(a′,o′A) ∈ SA ×
End(SB) (o
′
A ∈ O
k′A
A ) such that φ(a′,o′A)(ti) = t
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , n and φ(a′,o′A)(a
′
0) =
p0.
Even if an attacker finds a pseudo-key (a′0, φ(a′,o′A)) ∈ SA×End(SB) for Alice’s
secret, then she still faces an OA-submagma Membership Search Problem for SA.
Proposition 4.3. An oracle that solves the generalized modHomSP for (SB, SA)
and OA-MSP for SA is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 2.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice’s private key. The gen-
eralized modHomSP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a′0, φ(a′,o′A)) ∈ SA ×Hom(SB)
such that φ(a′,o′
A
)(ti) = t
′
i = α(ti) for all i = 1, . . . , n and φ(a′,o′A)(a
′
0) = p0. Observe
that this implies for any element eB ∈ SB that φ(a′,o′
A
)(eB) = α(eB). In particular,
we have φ(a′,o′
A
)(bi) = α(bi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ kB. Since a
′
0 ∈ SA, we may feed a
′
0
into a OA-MSP oracle for SA which returns a tree-word T
′
OA
(r1, . . . , rl) = a
′
0 (for
some l ∈ N and ri ∈ {sj}j≤m). Now, we may compute
K ′A = φ(a′,o′A)(T
′
OA
(β(r1), . . . , β(rl))
β homo
= φ(a′,o′
A
)(β(T
′
OA
(r1, . . . , rl)))
= φ(a′,o′
A
)(β(a
′
0)) = φ(a′,o′A)(bkB ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (b2 ∗B2 (b1 ∗B1 a
′
0)) · · · ))
homo
= φ(a′,o′
A
)(bkB) ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (φ(a′,o
′
A
)(b2) ∗B2 (φ(a′,o′A)(b1) ∗B1 φ(a′,o′A)(a
′
0))) · · · )
= α(bkB) ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (α(b2) ∗B2 (α(b1) ∗B1 p0)) · · · ) = KB.
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
Now, we describe approaches to break Protocol 2 which do not resort to solving
a submagma-MSP.
Proposition 4.4. A generalized HomSP oracle is sufficient to break key estab-
lishment Protocol 2. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized HomSP
for (SA, SB) and the HomP for SB is sufficient to break KEP 2.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys - though we do
not require a pseudo-key for the first component a0 of Alice’s key. The HomSP
oracle for SB provides φ(a′,o′
A
) with a
′ ∈ Lk
′
A and o′A ∈ O
k′A
A s.t. φ(a′,o′A)(tj) = t
′
j =
α(tj) for all j ≤ n. And the generalized HomSP oracle for (SA, SB) returns the
pseudo-key endomorphism φ(b′,o′
B
) with b
′ ∈ S
k′
B
B and o
′
B ∈ O
k′
B
B s.t. φ(b′,o′B)(si) =
s′i = β(si) for all i ≤ m. Since b
′ ∈ S
k′B
B , we conclude that φ(a′,o′A)(b
′
i) = α(b
′
i)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k′B. Also, a0 ∈ SA implies, of course, φ(b′,o′B)(a0) = β(a0). Let
o′B = (∗B′1, . . . , ∗B′k′
B
) Now, we compute
K ′B = φ(a′,o′A)(b
′
k′
B
) ∗B′
k′
B
(· · · ∗B′
3
(φ(a′,o′
A
)(b
′
2) ∗B′2 (φ(a′,o′A)(b
′
1) ∗B′1 p0)) · · · )
= α(b′k′
B
) ∗B′
k′
B
(· · · ∗B′
3
(α(b′2) ∗B′2 (α(b
′
1) ∗B′1 α(a0))) · · · )
homo
= α(b′k′
B
∗B′
k′
B
(· · · ∗B′
3
(b′2 ∗B′2 (b
′
1 ∗B′1 a0)) · · · ))
= α(φ(b′,o′
B
)(a0)) = α(β(a0)) = KA.

Alternatively, one may choose the following approach.
Proposition 4.5. An oracle that solves the generalized modHomSP for (SB, SA)
and the HomSP for SA is sufficient to break KEP 2.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys. The
HomSP oracle for SA provides φ(b′,o′
B
) ∈ End(SA) (with b
′ ∈ S
k′
B
B and o
′
B =
(∗B′
1
, . . . , ∗B′
k′
B
) ∈ O
k′
B
B ) s.t. φ(b′,o′B)(sj) = s
′
j = β(sj) for all j ≤ m. And the
generalized modHomSP oracle for (SB, SA) returns the pseudo-key (a
′
0, φ(a′,o′A)) ∈
SA × End(SB) (with a
′ ∈ S
k′
A
A and o
′
A ∈ O
k′
A
A ) s.t. φ(a′,o′A)(ti) = t
′
i = α(ti) for all
i ≤ n and φ(a′,o′
A
)(a
′
0) = p0. Since a
′
0 ∈ SA, we conclude that φ(b′,o′B)(a
′
0) = β(a
′
0).
Also, b ∈ SkBB implies, of course, φ(a′,o′A)(bi) = α(bi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ kB. Now, we
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compute
K ′A = φ(a′,o′A)(φ(b′,o′B)(a
′
0)) = φ(a′,o′A)(β(a
′
0))
= φ(a′,o′
A
)(bkB ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (b2 ∗B2 (b1 ∗B1 a
′
0)) · · · ))
homo
= φ(a′,o′
A
)(bkB) ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (φ(a′,o′A)(b2) ∗B2 (φ(a′,o′A)(b1) ∗B1 φ(a′,o′A)(a
′
0))) · · · )
= α(bkB) ∗BkB (· · · ∗B3 (α(b2) ∗B2 (α(b1) ∗B1 p0)) · · · ) = KB.

5. Instantiations using shifted conjugacy
5.1. Protocol 1. Consider the infinite braid group (B∞, ∗) with shifted conju-
gacy as LD-operation. Then the iterated LD-Problem is a simultaneous iterated
shifted conjugacy problem. For m = n = 1 this becomes an iterated shifted con-
jugacy problem. The shifted conjugacy problem. (see e.g. [De06]) which was first
solved in [KLT09] by a double reduction, first to the subgroup conjugacy problem
for Bn−1 in Bn, then to an instance of the simultaneous conjugacy problem. For
the simultaneous conjugacy problem in braid groups we refer to [LL02, KT13].
As the shifted CP, also the iterated shifted CP can be reduced to a subgroup
conjugacy problem for Bn−1 in Bn. Even if we replace shifted conjugacy by
generalized shifted conjugacy, then the corresponding iterated LD-problem still
reduces to a subgroup conjugacy problem for a standard parabolic subgroup of
a braid group. Such problems were first solved in a more general framework,
namely for Garside subgroups of Garside groups, in [KLT10]. Though not explic-
itly stated in [KLT09, KLT10], the simultaneous shifted conjugacy problem and
its analogue for generalized shifted conjugacy may be treated by similar methods
as in [KLT09, KLT10]. Though these solutions provide only deterministic algo-
rithms with exponential worst case complexity, they may still affect the security
of Protocol 1 if we use such LD-systems in braid groups as platform LD-systems.
Moreover, efficient heuristic approaches to the shifted conjugacy problem were
developed in [LU08, LU09]. Therefore, one may doubt whether an instantiation
of Protocol 1 using (iterated) shifted conjugacy in braid groups provides a se-
cure KEP. Nevertheless, it is still more interesting than the classical AAG-KEP
for braid groups, and it might be considered as a first challenge for an possible
attacker.
5.2. Protocol 2. Here we propose a natural instantiation of Protocol 2 using
generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Consider the following natural
partial multi-LD-system (B∞, OA ∪ OB) in braid groups.
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Let 1 < q1 < q2 < p such that q1, p− q2 ≥ 3. Let any ∗α ∈ OA be of the form
x ∗α y = ∂
p(x−1)α∂p(y)x with α = α1τ
±1
p,pα2 for some α1 ∈ Bq1 , α2 ∈ Bq2. Anal-
ogously, any ∗β ∈ OB is of the form x ∗β y = ∂
p(x−1)β∂p(y)x with β = β1τ
±1
p,pβ2
for some β1∂
q2 ∈ (Bp−q2), β2 ∈ ∂
q1(Bp−q1). Since [α1, β1] = [α1, β2] = [β1, α2] = 1,
(B∞, ∗α, ∗β) is a mutual left distributive system according to Proposition 2.4 (d).
Note that, if in addition we have [α1, α2] = [β1, β2] = 1, then (B∞, ∗α, ∗β) is a
bi-LD-system according to Proposition 2.4 (c). But in general these additional
commutativity relations do not hold for our choice of standard parabolic sub-
groups as domains for α1, α2, β1, β2. Note that, if we restrict α2, β2 to ∂
q1(Bq2−q1),
then these additional relations are enforced. Anyway, they are not necessary for
(B∞, ∗α, ∗β) being a mutual left distributive system. In either case, α2 does not
need to commute with β2.
Alice and Bob perform the protocol steps of Protocol 2 for the partial multi-
LD-system (B∞, OA ∪ OB) as described in section 4.1.
The deterministic algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10] do not affect the security
of this instantiation of Protocol 2, because the operations are part of the secret.
We provide an explicit formula for the public information (here s′i) depending
on si and Bob’s secret keys, namely k = kB ∈ N and (b, oβ) ∈ S
k
B × O
k
B where
b = (b1, . . . , bk) and oβ = (∗β1, . . . , ∗βk) and x∗βi = β
′
iτ
ǫi
p,pβ
′′
i with β
′ ∈ ∂q2(Bp−q2) ⊆
Bp, β
′ ∈ ∂q1(Bp−q1) ⊆ Bp and ǫi ∈ {±1}. Let b˜ = ∂
(k−1)p(b1) · · ·∂
p(bk−1)bk,
β˜ ′ = β ′kβ
′
k−1 · · ·β
′
1 and β˜
′′ =
∏k
i=1 ∂
(i−1)p(β ′′i ). Then we have
(11) s′i = ∂
p(b˜−1)β˜ ′∂p(β˜ ′′)τ ǫkp,p∂
p(τ ǫk−1p,p ) · · ·∂
(k−1)p(τ ǫ1p,p)∂
kp(si)b˜.
Figure 5. Structure of Bob’s public key s′i.
b−1kB
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For ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫk) ∈ {±1}
k, we introduce the abreviation
τ(p, ǫ) = τ ǫkp,p∂
p(τ ǫk−1p,p ) · · ·∂
(k−1)p(τ ǫ1p,p).
We conclude that the Homomorphism Search Problem for SA specifies to the
following particular (modified) simultaneous decomposition problem.
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ B
2
∞ with
s′i = ∂
p(b˜−1)β˜ ′∂p(β˜ ′′)τ(p, ǫ)∂kp(si)b˜
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for some (unknown) k ∈ N, ǫ ∈ {±}k, b˜ ∈ B∞,
β˜ ′ ∈ ∂q2(Bp−q2), β˜
′′ ∈
k∏
j=1
∂(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1).
Objective: Find k′ ∈ N, ǫ′ ∈ {±}k
′
, bˆ ∈ B∞, βˆ
′ ∈ ∂q2(Bp−q2), βˆ
′′ ∈
∏k′
j=1 ∂
(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1)
such that
s′i = ∂
p(bˆ−1)βˆ ′∂p(βˆ ′′)τ(p, ǫ′)∂k
′p(si)bˆ
for all i = 1, . . . , m.
Note that one has also to determine the iteration depth k = kB of Bob’s secret
homomorphism β (or some pseudo iteration depth k′) as well the bit sequence
ǫ ∈ {±1}k. Since all instance elements live in some BN ⊆ B∞ for some finite
N ∈ N, it is easy to obtain an upper bound for k from N .
Remark 5.1. If we abandon simultaneity, i.e. in the case m = 1, we obtain a
(modified) special decomposition problem. In the following section we transform
this particular problem to finitely many instances of the subgroup conjugacy coset
problem for parabolic subgroups of braid groups.
5.3. Conjugacy coset problem.
Definition 5.2. Let H,K be subgroups of a group G. We call the following
problem the subgroup conjugacy coset problem (SCCP) for (H,K) in G.
Input: An element pair (x, y) ∈ G2 such that xG ∩Hy 6= ∅.
Objective: Find elements h ∈ H and c ∈ K such that cxc−1 = hy.
If K = G then we call this problem the conjugacy coset problem (CCP) for H in
G.
This is the search (or witness) version of this problem. The corresponding
decision problem is to decide whether the conjugacy class of x and the left H-
coset of y intersect, i.e. whether xG ∩ Hy
?
= ∅. Anyway, in our cryptographic
context we usually deal with search problems.
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It is clear from the definition that the SCCP is harder than the double coset
problem (DCP) and the subgroup conjugacy problem (subCP), i.e., an oracle
that solves SCCP for any pair (H,K) ≤ G2 also solves DCP and subCP.
Though the CCP and the SCCP are natural group-theoretic problems, they
seem to have attracted little attention in combinatorial group theory so far. To
our knowledge they have been introduced in [KT13].
We connect the (modified) special decomposition problem from the previous
section to the SCCP.
Proposition 5.3. The (modified) special decomposition problem (for m = 1)
from section 5.2 can be solved by solving 2k instances of the SCCP for some stan-
dard parabolic subgroups in braid groups, namely the SCCP for (∂N−p+q2(Bp−q2) ·∏k
j=1 ∂
(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1), BN−p) in BN for some k,N ∈ N.
Proof. For m = 1, we write s = sm and s
′ = s′m. Let N ∈ N be sufficiently
large such that s′ ∈ BN . For convenience, we choose a minimal N such that
N ≥ (k + 1)p and p | N . As in [KLT09, KT13] we conclude that b˜ ∈ BN−p and
∂p(b˜−1) ∈ ∂p(BN−p). Therefore we have
τ−1p,N−p∂
p(b˜−1) = b˜−1τ−1p,N−p.
Furthermore, since τp,ǫβ˜
′′ = ∂p(β˜ ′′)τp,ǫ, we get
s′ = ∂p(b˜−1)β˜ ′∂p(β˜ ′′)τ(p, ǫ)∂kp(s)b˜ ⇔
τ−1p,N−ps
′ = b˜−1τ−1p,N−pβ˜
′∂p(β˜ ′′)τ(p, ǫ)∂kp(s)b˜
= b˜−1∂N−p(β˜ ′)β˜ ′′τ−1p,N−pτ(p, ǫ)∂
kp(s)b˜ ⇔
b˜s˜′b˜−1 = β˜ · s˜
with s˜′ = τ−1p,N−ps
′, s˜ = τ−1p,N−pτp,ǫ∂
kp(s), and
β˜ = ∂N−p(β˜ ′)β˜ ′′ ∈ ∂N−p+q2(Bp−q2) ·
k∏
j=1
∂(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1).
So, if we solve this SCCP for all ǫ ∈ {±1}k, we obtain a solution to the (modified)
special decomposition problem (for m = 1) from section 5.2. Note that |{±1}k| =
2k. 
Recall that the algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10], as well as from [GKLT13],
only solve instances of the subgroup conjugacy problem for parabolic subgroups of
braid groups, partially by transformation to the simultaneous conjugacy problem
in braid groups [KTTV13]. No deterministic or even heuristic solution to the
SCCP for (standard) parabolic subgroups in braid groups is known yet.
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Open problem. Find a solution to the SCCP, or even the CCP, for (standard)
parabolic subgroups in the braid group BN .
The attacker might try to approach first an apparently much easier (but still
open) problem, namely the SCCP, or even the CCP, for (standard) parabolic
subgroups in the symmetric group SN , which is a natural qoutient of BN , given
by the homomorphism σi 7→ (i, i+ 1).
The CCP (and the SCCP) appear to be inherently quadratic, i.e. we do not see
how it may be linearized such that linear algebra attacks as the linear centralizer
attack of B. Tsaban [Ts12] apply. It shares this feature with Y. Kurt’s Triple
Decomposition Problem (see section 4.2.5. in [MSU11]). Note that k is still
unknown to the attacker, but N (even N/p) is surely an upper bound for k.
Anyway, it suffices to solve O(2N) SCCP-instances. This is the main advantage
of the iterated Protocol 2 compared to Protocol 2 from [KT13] (not iterated).
Remark. But the SCCP for (∂N−p+q2(Bp−q2) ·
∏k
j=1 ∂
(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1), BN−p)
in BN admits a small disadvantage - compared to a SCCP for (H,K) in BN for
arbitrary (standard) parabolic subgroups H,K of BN - which hasn’t been pointed
out in [KT13].
s˜ lives in ∂kp(BN−kp). Therefore, ∂
N−p(β˜ ′) · s˜ commutes with
β˜ ′′ ∈
k∏
j=1
∂(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1) ⊆ Bkp.
Therefore, the attacker may conclude that s˜′ is conjugated (by a conjugator
b˜ ∈ BN−p) to an element in the (standard) parabolic subgroup ∂
kp(BN−kp) ·∏k
j=1 ∂
(j−1)p+q1(Bp−q1), BN−p), namely ∂
N−p(β˜ ′)s˜ · β˜ ′′. Using Nielsen-Thurston
theory or some kind of subgroup distance attack this feature might be exploited
by the attacker. We leave this as an open problem.
5.4. Challenges. As a challenge for a possible attacker, we provide some sug-
gestions for the involved parameter values.
(1) Since the complexity of the involved braids might grow exponentially with
the number l of internal nodes of the involved p.r.b. trees, an implementation of
Protocol 2 in braid groups (as outlined in section 5.2) can only be efficient for
small parameter values. Nevertheless, as a challenge, we suggest, for example,
the following parameter values. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1.
The braids s1, t1, a1, . . . , akA, b1, . . . , bkB are generated as "random" signed words
(over the standard generators σi) of length L = 15 in BN with N = 10. We
choose p = 6 for the generalized shift and q = q1 = q2 = p/2 = 3. The braid
A′1, . . . , A
′
kA
and A′′1, . . . , A
′′
kA
are generated as "random" signed words (over the
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standard generators σi) of length Lops = 5 in Bq. The B
′
i’s and B
′′
i ’s are chosen
analogeoulsy, but from ∂q(Bq). The iteration depths are set to kA = kB = 3, and
we set the number l = lA = lB of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted
binary trees to 4.
(2) A more efficient implementation in braid groups can be obtained by using
the bi-LD-system (B∞, ∗, ∗¯). As a challenge, we suggest, for example, the follow-
ing parameter values. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1. The
braids s1, t1, a1, . . . , akA, b1, . . . , bkB are generated as "random" signed words (over
the standard generators σi) of length L = 25 in BN with N = 4. The iteration
depths are set to k := kA = kB = 5, and we set the number l = lA = lB of internal
nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees to 5.
A disadvantage of this scheme is the following. Analogeously to Proposition
5.3 one may attack this scheme by solving 2k instances of the subgroup CP for
some standard parabolic subgroup in braid groups, namely the subgroup CP for
BN−1 in BN for some N ∈ N.
(3) An extremely efficient implementation of Protocol 2 (as outlined in section
5.2) can be obtained by working in in the quotient system S∞ rather than the par-
tial multi-LD-system B∞. Here we may choose much larger parameter values as
a challenge. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1. The permutations
s1, t1, a1, . . . , akA, b1, . . . , bkB are generated as random permutations in SN with
N = 200. We choose p = 20 for the generalized shift and q = q1 = q2 = p/2 = 10.
The permutations A′1, . . . , A
′
kA
and A′′1, . . . , A
′′
kA
are generated as random permu-
tations in Sq. The iteration depths kA, kB are chosen from the interval [2, . . . , 30],
and we choose the numbers of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary
trees from the interval [10, . . . , 20].
Analogeously to Proposition 5.3 one may attack Bob’s secret by solving O(k)
(k = kB) instances of the SCCP for some standard parabolic subgroups in sym-
metric groups, namely the SCCP for (∂N−p+q2(Sp−q2)·
∏k
j=1 ∂
(j−1)p+q1(Sp−q1), SN−p)
in SN for some k,N ∈ N. Note that here for an attack on Bob’s key the solu-
tion O(k) (rather than 2k) SCCP-instance suffices. This is because under the
surjection B∞ → S∞, τ(p, ǫ) maps to the fixed permutation(
1 · · · p p+ 1 · · · (k + 1)p
kp + 1 · · · (k + 1)p 1 · · · kp
)
for all ǫ ∈ {±1}k, and only k remains unknown.
6. Other instantiations
6.1. Instantiations using f-conjugacy. A straightforward computation yields
the following proposition.
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Proposition 6.1. Let G be a group and f1, f2 ∈ End(G). Then (G, ∗f1, ∗f2) with
x ∗fi y = fi(x
−1y)x (for i = 1, 2) is a mutually left distributive system if and only
if f1 = f2.
Therefore, we don’t have any nontrivial partial multi-LD-structures using f -
conjugacy. We only have the platform LD-system (G, ∗f) for some fixed endo-
morphism f ∈ End(G) and we can only apply Protocol 1.
In Protocol 1 Bob’s public key consist of elements s′i = bkB ∗f (· · · b2 ∗f (b1 ∗f
si) · · · ) (for i = 1, . . . , m). Evaluating the right hand side, we obtain
s′i = f(b
−1
kB
) · · ·fkB−1(b−12 )f
kB(b−11 ) · f
kB(si) · f
kB−1(b1) · · ·f(bkB−1)bkB .
= f(b˜)fkB(si)b˜ with b˜ = f
kB−1(b1) · · ·f(bkB−1)bkB .
Since 〈s1〉∗f = {s1}, we cannot abandon simultaneity for f -conjugacy, i.e. we
have m ≥ 2. Therefore, we have for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m
s′i(s
′
j)
−1 = f(b˜−1)fkB(sis
−1
j )f(b˜), and
(s′j)
−1si = b˜
−1fkB(s−1j si)b˜.
Now, an attacker might try to solve (in parallel) the following 2UB
(
m
2
)
-simultaneous
CP-instances:
{(s′i(s
′
j)
−1, fk(sis
−1
j )) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}, ∀k = 1, . . . , UB, and
{((s′j)
−1si, f
k(s−1j si)) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}, ∀k = 1, . . . , UB.
where U denotes some upper bound on kB which might be obtained from the
public keys or parameter specifications of the particular f -conjugacy KEP instan-
tiation. Actually, it suffices to solve the latter UB
(
m
2
)
-simultaneous CP-instances.
If the center of G is "small", the attacker might obtain the original private keys
kB and b˜. Similarly, he might approach Alice’s private keys by solving (in paral-
lel) UA
(
n
2
)
-simultaneous CP-instances, where kA ≤ UA. Thus she might possibly
obtain also kA and a˜ = f
kA−1(a1) · · · f(akA−1)akA, and from these f
kA(a0). This
suffices to recover the shared key
K = f(a˜−1)fkA+1(b˜−1)fkA+kB(a0)f
kA(b˜)a˜.
Therefore, it is recommended to choose the generators si (and tj) of SA (and SB)
such that the following sets have large centralizers
{fkB(sis
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}, {f
kB(sis
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m},
{fkA(tit
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}, {f
kA(tit
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}.
Since Alice cannot know kB (and Bob not kA), this might be achieved by choosing
the si’s and tj ’s such that the generator sets of SA and SB have already large
centralizers.
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Instantiation in finite matrix groups. Here we propose an efficient instantiation
of the iterated f -conjugacy KEP in the finite matrix group G = GL(d,FpN ) where
the f -conjugacy operation is given by the homomorphism f ∈ End(G) that is
induced by the Frobenius ring endomorphism Fr ∈ End(FpN ), defined by x 7→ x
p.
Since ord(Fr) = N induces ordf = N , the iteration depths kA, kB are bounded
below n. Therefore, it is recommended to choose p small and N "large". As a
challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Set d = 6,
p = 2, N = 40, m = n = 8, and the iteration depths are kA = kB = 25. We set
the number l = lA = lB of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary
trees to 10.
Example 6.2. As a further example we propose a possible instantiation of the
iterated f -conjugacy KEP in pure braid groups.
Recall that the N -strand braid group BN is generated by σ1, ..., σN−1 where
inside σi the (i+1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. There exists a natural
epimorphism from BN onto the symmetric group SN , defined by σi 7→ (i, i+ 1).
Let G be the kernel of this epimorphism, namely the N -strand pure braid group
PN . For some small integer d ≥ 1, consider the epimorphism ηd : PN −→
PN−d given by "pulling out" (or erasing) the last d strands, i.e. the strands
N−d+1, . . . , N . Consider the shift map ∂ : BN−1 −→ BN , defined by σi 7→ σi+1,
and note that ∂d(PN−d) ≤ PN . Now, we define the endomorphism f : PN −→ PN
by the composition f = ∂d ◦ ηd, and our KEP is Protocol 1 applied to the LD-
system (PN , ∗f). Note that the iteration depths kA, kB are bound below N/d.
Here, d = 1 is of particular interest since it allows for the biggest upper bound
on kA and kB.
Alternatively, one may use the following modified scheme. Recall that PN is
generated by the
(
N
2
)
elements
Ai,j = σj−1 · · ·σi+1σ
2
i σ
−1
i+1 · · ·σ
−1
j−1 (1 ≤ i < j ≤ N).
Now, for d ≥ 3, define f ∈ End(PN) by f(A
±1
i,j ) = c
±1 · ∂d ◦ ηd(A
−1
i,j ) where the
constant pure braid c ∈ PN is given by c = τN−d,dτd,N−dc0 for some constant pure
braid c0 ∈ Pd. Inside the pure braid τN−d,dτd,N−d the first d strands go around
the last N − d strands (or vice versa).
Remark 6.3. We leave it for future work to construct further instances of the
iterated f -conjugacy KEP. The following proposition suggests that any platform
LD-system (G, ∗f) with G group and f ∈ End(G) satisfying f
2 6= f .
Proposition 6.4. Consider the relation →∗f induced by f -conjugacy, i.e. x→∗f y
if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c ∗f x = f(c
−1x)c. The relation →∗f is
transitive if and only if f is a projector, i.e. f 2 = f .
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Therefore, if f is a projector the iterated f -conjugacy KEP doesn’t yield any
advantage compared to its non-iterated version (see [KT13]).
Furthermore, the following (iterated version of the) f -conjugator search prob-
lem should be hard.
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 with
s′i = f(b˜
−1)fkB(si)b˜ ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
for some (unknown) kB ∈ N, b˜ ∈ G.
Objective: Find k′B ∈ N, bˆ ∈ G such that
s′i = f(bˆ
−1)fk
′
B(si)bˆ ∀i = 1, . . . , m.
6.2. Instantiations using f-symmetric conjugacy. A straightforward com-
putation yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5. Let G be a group and f1, f2 two projectors in End(G). Then
(G, ∗f1, ∗f2) with x ∗fi y = fi(xy
−1)x (for i = 1, 2) is a mutually left distributive
system if and only if f1 = f2.
Therefore, we don’t have any nontrivial partial multi-LD-structures using f -
symmetric conjugacy. We only have the platform LD-system (G, ∗f) for some
fixed projector f ∈ End(G) and we can only apply Protocol 1.
In Protocol 1 Bob’s public key consist of elements s′i = bkB ∗f (· · · b2 ∗f (b1 ∗f
si) · · · ) (for i = 1, . . . , m). Evaluating the right hand side, we obtain
s′i =
{
f(bkBb
−1
kB−1
· · · b3b
−1
2 b1) · f(s
−1
i ) · f(b1b
−1
2 b3 · · · b
−1
kB−1
)bkB , kB odd,
f(bkBb
−1
kB−1
· · · b−13 b2b
−1
1 ) · f(si) · f(b
−1
1 b2b
−1
3 · · · b
−1
kB−1
)bkB , kB even.
Consider the relation →∗f induced by f -symmetric conjugacy, i.e. x →∗f y
if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c ∗f x = f(cx
−1)c. The relation →∗f is
never transitive. Therefore, the iterated f -conjugacy KEP always provides an
advantage compared to its non-iterated version (see [KT13]).
We conclude the following m-simultaneous iterated f -symmetric conjugator
search problem should be hard.
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ G
2 with
s′i = f(bkB · · · b
±1
3 b
∓1
2 b
±1
1 )f(s
∓1
i )f(b
±1
1 b
∓1
2 b
±1
3 · · · b
−1
kB−1
) · bkB ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
for some (unknown) kB ∈ N, b1, . . . , bk ∈ G.
Objective: Find k′B ∈ N, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
k′
B
∈ G such that
s′i = f(bk′B · · · (b
′
2)
∓1(b′1)
±1)f(s∓1i )f((b
′
1)
±1(b′2)
∓1 · · · (b′kB−1)
−1) · b′kB
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
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Remark 6.6. As for f -conjugacy, since 〈s1〉∗f = {s1}, we cannot abandon simul-
taneity for f -symmetric conjugacy, i.e. we have m ≥ 2. Therefore, we have for
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m
s′i(s
′
j)
−1 = f(s∓1i s
±1
j )
f(b∓1
1
b±1
2
···b−1
kB
)
, and
(s′j)
−1s′i = f(s
±1
j s
∓1
i )
f(b±1
1
b∓1
2
···b−1
kB−1
)·bkB .
Now, an attacker might try to solve the following two
(
m
2
)
-simultaneous CP-
instances:
{(s′i(s
′
j)
−1, f(s∓1i s
±1
j )) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}, and
{((s′j)
−1si, f(s
±1
j s
∓1
i )) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}.
Note that here the attacker has to solve both
(
m
2
)
-simultaneous CP-instances.
If the center of G is "small", the attacker might obtain the private keys b˜lhs =
f(bkB · · · b
−ǫB
2 b
ǫB
1 ) and b˜rhs = f(b
ǫB
1 b
−ǫB
2 · · · b
−1
kB−1
) ·bkB , where ǫB = 1 if kB odd and
−1 otherwise. Similarly, he might approach Alice’s private keys by solving two(
n
2
)
-simultaneous CP-instances, thus possibly obtaining the corresponding keys
a˜lhs = f(akA · · ·a
−ǫA
2 a
ǫA
1 ) and a˜rhs = f(a
ǫA
1 a
−ǫA
2 · · · a
−1
kA−1
) · akA, and from these
(and p0) f(a0). This suffices to recover the shared key
K = f(akA · · · a
ǫA
1 b
−ǫA
kB
· · · b−ǫAǫB1 a
ǫAǫB
0 b
−ǫAǫB
1 · · · · b
−ǫA
kB
aǫA1 · · · a
−1
kA−1
) · akA
= a˜lhsb˜rhsf(a0)
ǫAǫBf(b˜rhs)a˜rhs.
Therefore, it is recommended to choose the generators si (and tj) of SA (and SB)
such that the following sets have large centralizers
{f(sis
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m}, {f(sis
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m},
{f(tit
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}, {f(tit
−1
j ) | 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n}.
This might be achieved by choosing the si’s and tj ’s such that the generator sets
of SA and SB have already large centralizers.
6.2.1. Finite matrix groups as platforms. . (1) We propose matrix groups over
the field of multivariate rational functions F (t1, . . . , tN) over F = Fq as possible
platform groups. The projecting endomorphism f is an evaluation endomorphism,
evaluating M (M ≤ N) variables over the finite field Fq. More precisely, let
d ∈ N, G = GL(d, F (t1, . . . , tN)), I ∈ {1, . . . , N}
M and c ∈ FMq . Then f =
fI,c ∈ End(G) is given by tIi 7→ ci for all i = 1, . . . ,M . Therefore, (G, ∗f) is our
platform LD-system with ∗f being f -symmetric conjugacy.
All generators si and tj should be chosen such that their images under the eval-
uation homomorphism f are invertible, and they should have large centralizers.
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The large centralizer condition might be satisfied, for example, using the follow-
ing construction. For d = N , we consider images of pure braids under the Gassner
representation PN −→ GL(d, F (t1, . . . , tN )) [Ga61] (where we reduce the involved
integers modulo q). Images of (conjugates of) reducible (or "cabled") pure braids
will certainly have "large" centralizers.
Unfortunately, since the coefficient ring F (t1, . . . , tN) is infinite, the numerator
and denominator polynomials start to grow quickly. Thus, G = GL(d, F (t1, . . . , tN))
is only for small parameter values an efficient platform group. Nevertheless, as
a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Let d = 4,
M = N = 1, and q = 37. For simplicity, we assume that q is prime. Furthermore,
we set m = n = 6, and the iteration depths are kA = kB = 5. We set the number
l = lA = lB of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees to 5.
Recall that these trees are needed for the generation of a0, b1, . . . , bkB .
(2) The simultaneous iterated f -symmetric conjugator search problem appears
to be hard even in finite groups. Here we propose a more efficient instantiation of
the iterated f -symmetric conjugacy KEP in the finite matrix groupG = GL(d, R)
with coefficient ring R = Fp[X ]/(X
N − 1) (N = p − 1) where the f -symmetric
conjugacy operation is given by the homomorphism f ∈ End(G) that is induced
by the evaluation homomorphism R −→ Fp, defined by X 7→ r for some fixed
r ∈ F∗p. This map is well defined since r
p−1 − 1 = 0 for all r ∈ F∗p according to
Fermat’s little theorem. Though the ring R has the same cardinality as Fpp−1, R
is not a field since the polynomial Xp−1 − 1 =
∏
r∈F∗p
(X − r) is not irreducible.
For general N , R is also called the ring of N-truncated polynomials, and it is the
platform ring of NTRUEncrypt [HPS98].
As a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Set
d = 4, p = 17, m = n = 8, and the iteration depths are kA = kB = 10. We set
the number l = lA = lB of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary
trees also to 10.
More generally, we could have chosen R = Fq[X ]/(g) as our coefficient ring,
where g is a reducible polynomial (of degree N) over Fq and q is some prime
power. Then f ∈ End(G) is induced by some evaluation homomorphism on R
which evaluates X on a root of g.
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